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Family Law. In re Jason L., 810 A.2d 765 (R.I. 2002). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews decisions terminating paren-
tal rights to determine whether any legally competent evidence ex-
ists to support the decision of the family court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Elise S. appealed from a family court decree terminating her
parental rights for six of her seven children.1 Since 1997, Elise has
been involved in a tumultuous and abusive relationship with Juan
S., also known as Chino.2 Chino has beaten Elise and two of her
children on several occasions. 3
In January 1997, the Department of Children, Youth, and
Families (DCYF) learned that Chino was abusing Elise's children.4
After a no-contact order was issued against Chino, DCYF filed neg-
lect and abuse petitions against Elise.5 DCYF then took tempo-
rary custody of one child. 6 On February 21, 1997, Elise regained
custody of her child provided the no-contact order against Chino
remained in effect. 7 Elise, however, allowed the order to lapse
when she failed to appear for a hearing.8 On March 13, 1997, Elise
allowed Chino to return to her home. 9 After some time, DCYF
found five of Elise's children to be neglected and abused. 10 All five
children were then committed to the care, custody, and control of
DCYF. 11
Between January 1997 and March 2000, DCYF continually
tried to reunite Elise with her children. 12 DCYF would only return
the children provided Chino was not allowed to remain in the
home. 13 Elise, however, was unwilling to keep her children from
the abusive man.' 4
1. In re Jason L., 810 A.2d 765, 765 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 766.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 768.
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On March 15, 2000, DCYF petitioned the family court to ter-
minate Elise's parental rights. 15 The family court granted the peti-
tion after a six-day hearing. 16 Accordingly, Elise appealed. 17
BACKGROUND
Section 15-7-7(a)(3) of Rhode Island General Laws provides
that:
The family court shall terminate a parent's rights if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the "child has been
placed in the legal custody or care of ... [DCYF] for at least
twelve (12) months; and the parents were offered or received
services to correct the situation which led to the child being
placed, and provided that there is not a substantial
probability that the child will be able to return safely to the
parents' care within a reasonable period of time."' 8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court stated that a family court decree terminat-
ing parental rights shall not be disturbed unless the findings are
clearly wrong or unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived
material evidence. 19 Before terminating a parent's rights under
section 15-7-7(a)(3) the family court must, inter alia, find the par-
ents were offered or received services to correct the situation that
led to the child being placed in the custody and care of DCYF.20
Thus, it must be clear that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reu-
nite the family.21 The court stated that the reasonable efforts de-
termination is subject to a case-by-case analysis and takes into
account parental conduct and cooperation. 22
In this case, the court noted that the record revealed countless
efforts on the part of DCYF to reunite the family. 23 DCYF pre-
pared numerous case plans, set up meetings with various agencies
15. Id. at 766.
16. Id. at 766-67.
17. Id. at 767.
18. Id. at 766 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(3) (2000)).
19. Id. (citing In re Chaselle S., 798 A.2d 892, 895 (R.I. 2002)).
20. Id. (citing § 15-7-7(a)(3)).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing In re Ryan S., 728 A.2d 454, 457 (R.I. 1999) (quoting In re Nicole
B., 763 A.2d 612, 618 (R.I. 1997))).
23. Id.
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that could help remedy the family problems, and assisted Elise in
obtaining housing.24 The court also noted that Elise repeatedly
demonstrated her unwillingness to keep her children away from
Chino. 25 The court determined that the efforts of DCYF were rea-
sonable in light of Elise's attitude.26
The court also stated that Elise's argument that she suffered
from Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS) is of no consequence. 27
Because BWS is a mental condition that has certain legal conse-
quences, a party must prove its existence by a preponderance of
the evidence. 28 Elise, however, offered no evidence to prove that
she suffered from BWS, thus her failure to do so constitutes a
waiver of that issue. 29
CONCLUSION
The supreme court reviews a decision to terminate parental
rights to determine whether any legally competent evidence exists
to support the trial justice's findings and whether DCYF made rea-
sonable efforts to reunite the family. In this case, the supreme
court upheld the family court's decision to terminate parental
rights because the record revealed that the efforts of DCYF to reu-
nite the family were more than reasonable.
Charles M. Edgar Jr.
24. Id. at 768.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Family Law. JH v. RB, 796 A.2d 447 (R.I. 2002). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is applicable to a divorce judgment obtained from another state.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff JH, a Florida resident, filed a paternity complaint in
Rhode Island Family Court seeking to establish that defendant
RB, a Rhode Island resident, is the natural father of her minor
child, CMH.1 Summary judgment was granted to RB in a hearing
before a family court magistrate judge on grounds that the Florida
divorce decree between JH and her ex-husband, BH, determined
the paternity of CMH.2 JH appealed, and another hearing was
conducted before a family court justice, who upheld the magis-
trate's order.3 JH made a timely appeal to the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court.4
JH alleged that she and RB had a sexual relationship from
1976 until 1996, with a brief, two-year interruption beginning in
1983.5 JH married BH, a Florida resident, during the interruption
of that affair.6 JH resumed the affair with RB in early 1985 de-
spite her marriage to BH. 7 CMH was conceived in July or August
1985.8 On July 26, 1989, the marriage between JH and BH ended
in a Florida divorce judgment.9 The judgment stated that two chil-
dren, one being CMH, were born of the marriage.' 0 Neither BH
nor JH disputed this finding." BH agreed to pay child support
and JH accepted those child support payments.' 2 JH successfully
mediated an increase in child support payments five months prior
to filing the paternity complaint in Rhode Island. 13
1. JH v. RB, 796 A.2d 447, 447-48 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 448.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 448-49.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 449.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, Article IV, Section I of the United States Constitu-
tion, is applicable to a divorce judgment obtained from another
state's court. 14 The court stated that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is required to be applied, so long as there was a proper ex-
ercise of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction by the foreign
court.' 5 The court noted that there was nothing in the record that
indicated the Florida court had not exercised proper jurisdiction
over both BH and JH at the time of their divorce. 16 In addition,
the fact that a divorce judgment is modifiable does not mean that it
is not final, and thus ineligible for protection by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 17
The court noted a Florida court decision, which stated that the
final dissolution of marriage is res judicata and barred any rede-
termination of the paternity of the child.' 8 The court drew a com-
parison to another Florida court decision, in a factually similar
case, which held that a party cannot accept benefits from a judg-
ment and then later deny the judgment's validity.19 Distinguish-
ing a case where the court had refused to honor a divorce judgment
from the Dominican Republic, where neither party had a connec-
tion to the forum; the court noted both JH and BH were Florida
residents at the time of their divorce. 20 The court also noted that
JH had an opportunity under Florida law to bring an action for
fraud upon the court to correct her divorce judgment and had not
done so.2 '
As an additional point of error, JH had argued that RB could
not rely on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to
14. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1).
15. Id. (quoting Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1085 (R.I. 1991) (citing Ma-
ryland Cent. Collection Unit v. Bd. of Regents for Educ. of the Univ. of R.I., 529
A.2d 144, 152-53 (R.I. 1987))).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Robinson, 629
So. 2d 1000, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Pelella v. Pelella, 604 So. 2d
14, 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992))).
19. Id. (quoting Narcisi v. Brusko, 510 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987)).
20. Id. at 449-50 (citing Jewell v. Jewell, 751 A.2d 735, 735 (R.I. 2000)).
21. Id. at 449 (quoting Lefler v. Lefler, 776 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001)).
SURVEY SECTION
enforce the Florida judgment because he was not a party to the
judgment. 22 However, the court said that the trial judge was not
required to consider these doctrines because the application of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was dispositive of the issue.23
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the
family court that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied to the
divorce judgment as long as there was a proper exercise of
jurisidiction. This entitled the defendant to summary judgment.
Joshua A. Stockwell
22. Id. at 450.
23. Id.
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Family Law. State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the termination of parental rights
does not, as a matter of law, end a terminated parent's child sup-
port obligation. Instead, a separate hearing must be had to deter-
mine the child's interest in support.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
David Fritz was divorced from his wife Lorraine in January
1994, ending a marriage that bore two children.1 Following the
divorce proceedings, a decree was entered that set child support
payable by Mr. Fritz at $147.50 per week. 2 In November 1994,
upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that Fritz had
abused his children,3 the Rhode Island Department of Children,
Youth and Family (DCYF) initiated a petition for the "voluntary"
termination of David Fritz's parental rights, which was granted. 4
Mr. Fritz never moved to have the original child support order va-
cated5 and because of this the Rhode Island office of Child Support
Enforcement (CSE) continued to consider Fritz's child support or-
der as being valid. 6 By 1997, the estimated arrearage owed by
Fritz was in excess of $30,0007 and the office of the attorney gen-
eral, at the behest of CSE, issued a felony complaint for violation of
section 11-2-1.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws.8 This com-
plaint was not filed, until Fritz's arrest in May 2000. 9 Finally, the
state filed a criminal information against Fritz in August 2000 be-
1. State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 681 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. A petition to terminate parental rights must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7 (2000).
4. Fritz, 801 A.2d at 690.
5. Id. at 681. Section 11-2-1.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides:
Every person who is obligated to pay child support pursuant to an order or
decree established by or registered with the family court pursuant to
chapter 11.1 of title 15, who has incurred arrearage of past-due child sup-
port in the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), and having the
means to do so, who willfully fails to pay one or more installment of child
support in an amount previously set by the court, is guilty of a felony for
each similar instance of failure to make subsequent payments.
R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-2-1.1 (2000).
6. Fritz, 801 A.2d at 681-82.
7. Id. at 682.
8. Id.
9. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
cause, to the state's calculation, the defendant owed a support ar-
rearage in excess of $75,000.10
Following Mr. Fritz's motion to dismiss, Chief Justice Jer-
emiah of the Rhode Island Family Court ruled that Mr. Fritz was
not responsible for the back child support." Chief Justice Jer-
emiah made this ruling based on his interpretation of section 15-
7.2-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws. 12 Stating that this stat-
ute made it clear the termination of Mr. Fritz's rights also negated
his responsibilities, the Chief Justice dismissed the complaint
against Mr. Fritz. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The attorney general appealed following the family court's dis-
missal. 14 The appeal was accepted, and in an opinion by Justice
Lederberg, the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the family
court's dismissal of the complaint, and held that child support obli-
gations are not automatically suspended by a voluntary termina-
tion of parental rights.' 5 The court based its decision on its own
statutory construction. 16 The court's construction was not of sec-
tion 15-7.2-2 but rather section 15-7-7.17 The court based its opin-
ion on the fact that while section 15-7.2-2 mentions termination of
both rights and responsibilities' 8 section 15-7-7 mentions only the
termination of rights. 19 According to the court, section 15-7.2-2 ev-
idences that the legislature "knew how" to terminate responsibili-
ties and rights at the same time.20 This being the case, the
absence of the word responsibility in section 15-7-7 is, according to
the court, evidence that the legislature intended to leave responsi-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 684; R.I. GEN LAWS § 15-7.2-2 (2000) ("[Aldoption is based upon the
legal termination of parental rights and responsibilities of birth parents."). Other
than noting that Mr. Fritz had relinquished his right to be notified of or consent to
an adoption the family court gave no indication of why the adoption statute should
be applied in this case. See Fritz, 801 A.2d at 684.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 682.
15. Id. at 685.
16. See id. at 683-85.
17. Id. at 684.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
20031
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bilities intact in those situations. 21 The court also noted that the
right to inherit survives a parental right termination. 22 Building
on this concept, the court noted that a child's "ongoing rights" to
financial assistance represent an independent interest that must
be represented at a hearing. 23 Putting these two factors together
the court decided that Mr. Fritz's child support obligations had not
ceased.24 This decision made Mr. Fritz responsible for the arrear-
age in child support payments in excess of $75,000.25
Justice Goldberg's Opinion
Justice Goldberg dissented from the majority's opinion. 26 The
main thrust of Justice Goldberg's dissent is a response to the ma-
jority's contention that allowing a parent to voluntarily terminate
his or her parental rights to escape child support payments would
cause a flood of parents to seek termination of their rights.2 7 The
Justice pointed out that in Rhode Island a "voluntary petition" for
termination of parental rights can only be filed by the state.28 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Goldberg argued that the majority's vision of "re-
calcitrant parent[s]" lining up to terminate their parental rights in
order to avoid support obligations could not come to fruition.29 The
opinion further posited that the court's reading of the section 15-7-
7 frustrated the legislature's purpose in enacting that statute and
was not consonant with the termination of parental rights in the
adoption context.30
CONCLUSION
A parent whose parental rights were terminated is still re-
sponsible for any child support owed under a court decree until
21. Id.
22. Id. at 686.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 688.
26. Id. at 689 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 690.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 691.
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such time as a hearing can be held to evaluate the interests of the
child or children in receiving support.
Mark Ted Romley
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Family Law. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138 (R.I.
2002). A transfer of property from one spouse to both spouses
jointly creates a rebuttable presumption that the intent of the
transferor was to give the transferee a present joint interest in the
property. The presumption can be rebutted by clear and convinc-
ing evidence to the contrary.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Prior to the marriage of Lawrence and Shari Ann Stephenson,
Lawrence held numerous bank accounts and investments in vari-
ous financial institutions.' He held some of the accounts in his
name alone, some in his corporation's name, and yet other ac-
counts jointly with his brother.2 After returning from their honey-
moon, Shari Ann repeatedly asked Lawrence to add her name to
his individual accounts. 3 Eventually, he acquiesced and added her
name to twelve of his accounts, which valued approximately
$483,000.4 The only other change to the accounts during the mar-
riage was the accrual of interest.5
At the divorce proceeding, the trial court found that Lawrence
did not intend to give Shari Ann a present possessory interest in
the accounts and that the addition of her name was merely a mat-
ter of convenience. 6 In determining that Lawrence did not intend
to give Shari Ann a present interest in the accounts, the trial jus-
tice considered the short length of the marriage and the contribu-
tions of the parties to the marital estate during the marriage. 7
However, he still concluded, as a matter of law, that making the
accounts joint was a transfer to the marital estate and that Law-
rence's intent was irrelevant.8 The trial justice then awarded Law-
rence all of the accounts as part of the divorce proceedings. 9 In
consideration of this distribution, he ordered Lawrence to pay
Shari Ann $250,000.10 Both parties appealed. 1
1. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138, 1140 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1141.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found the conclusion that
the accounts were part of the marital estate was clearly errone-
ous. 12 The court held the transfer of property from one spouse in-
dividually to both spouses jointly creates only a rebuttable
presumption that the property was a transfer to the marital es-
tate.13 That presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.' 4 In the present case, the trial court
found Lawrence's testimony that he only added Shari Ann's name
for convenience, not intending to give her a present interest in the
accounts, credible. 15 The trial justice supported his finding with
evidence that Lawrence maintained control of the passbooks for
the accounts and paid taxes on the interest accrued on the ac-
counts. 16 Therefore, Lawrence did not have the requisite intent to
make a transfer to marital property and the trial justice erred in
not considering his intent.17 Accordingly, the supreme court re-
duced the amount of the marital estate by the amount of money in
the accounts and remanded the case for reconsideration of the
$250,000 awarded to Shari Ann.'
CONCLUSION
A transfer of property from one spouse individually to both
spouses jointly creates a rebuttable presumption that the transfer
was intended as a transfer to marital property; however, the pre-
sumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. In the present case, the name of the spouse was added
merely as a matter of convenience and was not intended as a trans-
fer to marital property. Credible testimony to this effect overcame
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1142-43.
14. Id. at 1142. This is known as the doctrine of transmutation. Id. (citing
Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 852 (R.I. 1986)). The doctrine requires an actual
intention objectively manifested in order to convert individual property to marital
property during the course of the marriage. Id. The transfer of assets from one
spouse to both spouses jointly will create a presumption that the transferor spouse
had the requisite intent to transfer the assets to the marital estate; however, that
presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id.
15. Id. at 1142-43.
16. Id. at 1143.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1143-44.
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the presumption that the transfer was one converting individual
property to marital property.
Amy Hughes
